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Prior Consent and the United
Nations Human Rights Instruments
Walter E. Spiegel*
Both Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1 and the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 2 endorse the concept
of freedom of information as a basic human right. In recent years however,
the concept has come under increased scrutiny as the international com-
munity has sought to develop a legal framework for the regulation of such
new technology as direct broadcast satellites. 3 The debate over the rela-
tionship between the rights expressed in the human rights instruments and
the regulation of direct satellite broadcasting has largely focused on the
issue of "prior consent," that is whether a transmitting state must obtain
the consent of another state prior to broadcasting to its territory.
In the recent debates leading to the adoption by the United Nations
General Assembly of the "Principles governing the use by States of artifi-
cial earth satellites for international direct television broadcasting" (Gener-
al Assembly Principles), 4 the United States delegate expressed the view
that imposing a requirement of prior consent would violate Article 19. 5
Despite support for this view among other Western nations, 6 the Resolu-
tion, which includes a prior consent requirement, 7 received strong support
from Third World and Eastern bloc nations and passed overwhelmingly. 8
In the view of developing countries, prior consent is necessary to prevent
the exacerbation of current inequities in the flow of international com-
munications and thereby to protect the integrity of national cultures. 9
Article 19, by enunciating the rights to seek and to impart, in addition to
the right to receive, information is seen as supporting the goal of correcting
these inequities through the development of a balanced flow of informa-
tion. 10
After reviewing the legal framework of an international right of free-
dom of information, this article examines United States opposition to prior
consent in the context of the human rights provisions. It contends that the
United States should not argue that any recognition of a right of prior
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consent is inconsistent with Article 19, but rather that international princi-
ples recognize a right of prior consent limited to certain types of program-
ming. The article then considers arguments for the Third World position
of strict prior consent concluding that, in addition to being inconsistent
with the general intent of Article 19, strict prior consent is not the proper
response to the inequities in world communications. 11 The General As-
sembly Principles attempt to reconcile the problems raised by new tech-
nology in a world of existing inequities by imposing a requirement of strict
prior consent on the use of this technology. 12 This article argues that a
better solution would be to define the broad limitations enunciated in the
human rights provisions so as to attempt to achieve consensus on those
areas of programming considered particularly objectionable. 13
INTERNATIONAL RIGHT OF FREEDOM OF INFORMATION
Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, unanimously
adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in 1948, declares:
"Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right
includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, re-
ceive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless
of frontiers." 14 The preamble to the Declaration expresses the expectation
that the Declaration would be "a common standard of achievement for all
peoples and all nations." 15 However, the current legal status of the Decla-
ration is in dispute. In the decades since its adoption, the principles enun-
ciated in the Declaration have been reaffirmed in other international
statements and agreements, 16 and invoked in national 17 and international
decisions. 18 As a result the Declaration has been recognized by some as an
authoritative interpretation of the human rights provisions of the United
Nations Charter, and as a codification of customary international law. 19
On the other hand, it has been argued that the principles enunciated in the
Declaration are not self-executing and consequently impose no legal obli-
gations on United Nations member states to incorporate them into their
legal systems. 20
The principles of Article 19 of the Universal Declaration are expressed
in substantially similar language in Article 19(2) of the Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights: "Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expres-
sion; this right shall include freedom to seek, receive and impart informa-
tion and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing
or in print, in the form of art, or through any other media of his choice." 21
The Civil and Political Covenant was designed, together with the Interna-
tional Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, 22 to set forth
in treaty form many of the provisions of the Universal Declaration. 2
3
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Approved by the General Assembly and opened for signature in 1966, the
Covenant is binding on those states that are parties to it. 24 The United
States is not a party to either covenant. As international discussion has
generally focused on the Universal Declaration, this article will concentrate
on that document, although the Covenant will also be mentioned.
Regardless of the precise legal status of these international instruments,
the principles enunciated have clearly become a focal point in the debates
on direct satellite broadcasting. These principles are expressed in broad,
general language and do not explicitly support either those in favor or
those opposed to prior consent. Consequently, although designed to be
"clear, precise and understandable," 25 Article 19 is in fact cited in support
of both sides of this debate.
PRIOR CONSENT AND ARTICLE 19
The United States has consistently opposed a regime incorporating a prior
consent requirement. In the recent debates in the United Nations Special
Political Committee 26 the United States representative, Mr. Lichenstein,
stated that, ". . any principle requiring that broadcaster[s] must obtain the
consent of a foreign Government would violate United States obligations
towards both the broadcasters and the intended audience; it would also
violate Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, on the
right to freedom of expression." 27 In the view of the United States, those
adopting the General Assembly Principles were unwilling to consider the
issue of prior consent (and the related issue of the international legal
responsibility of States regarding the content of broadcasting), "through
a non-prejudiced reference to the international law on these matters." 28
United States opposition to prior consent could be based on the belief that
it would violate both the right of the broadcaster to "impart" and the right
of the audience to "receive" information as expressed in Article 19.
Read alone, Article 19 of the Universal Declaration appears to grant
every individual an unrestricted right to receive information across nation-
al boundaries. However, Article 19 must be read in conjunction with
Article 29 of the Universal Declaration:
In the exercise of his rights and freedom, everyone shall be subject only to
such limitations as are determined by law solely for the purpose of securing
due recognition and respect for the rights and freedoms of others and of
meeting the just requirements of morality, public order and the general
welfare in a democratic society. 29
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Limitations on the right to receive information are similarly expressed
in Article 19(3) of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights:
The exercise of the rights provided for in paragraph 2 (supra, note 4) of this
article carries with it special duties and responsibilities. It may therefore be
subject to certain restrictions, but these shall only be such as are provided
by law and are necessary: (a) For respect of the rights or reputations of others;
(b) For the protection of national security or of public order (ordre public),
or of public health or morals. 30
Thus these articles limit any restrictions placed on the right to receive
information to those introduced by way of law and necessary for the
purposes explicitly listed. Unfortunately, these purposes are articulated in
such broad language as to allow states wide discretion in their implementa-
tion of restrictions. The greatest latitude for restrictions lies in the allow-
ance of laws necessary for the protection of "public order (ordre public)."
Professor Buergenthal explains this concept as follows:
As a legal concept or term of art, the closest English equivalent to "ordre
public" is "public policy" which means that freedom of information may be
subjected to limitations based on considerations of public policy. The public
policy of a state is reflected in its political, cultural, educational, social and
economic policies. Laws deemed necessary to protect the "public order"
could consequently encompass legislation prohibiting or restricting radio and
television advertisements, requiring the licensing of all or certain communi-
cations media, promulgating programming standards, regulating the impor-
tation of foreign cultural and information products, and so on. 31
One would expect a similar divergence in those restrictions deemed neces-
sary by a state to protect the public morals.
Thus the right of the individual to receive information is not absolute. 32
In order for a 'government to exercise its Article 29 right to limit or
restrict programming contrary to morality or to the public order of the
state, its prior consent to certain types of programming seemingly must first
be obtained. 33 However, the state's right to restrict the individual's right
to receive and therefore the extent of its ability to demand prior consent,
should not be read broadly. Article 30 of the Universal Declaration prohib-
its a state from enacting legislation aimed at destroying the rights previ-
ously set forth. 34 An absolute right of prior consent would allow a
government to censor any foreign news or other broadcasting which the
government deemed threatening to its position or in any other way objec-
tionable. Consequently, a broad requirement of prior consent could de-
stroy the individual's right to receive "information and ideas through any
media and regardless of frontiers" by severely restricting the individual's
access to precisely the type of information which Article 19 should pro-
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tect. 35 Articles 29 and 30 qualify each other, Article 29 apparently identi-
fying areas of programming in which prior consent could be demanded by
a state and Article 30 limiting the scope of the areas. 36
United States opposition to prior consent could also be based on belief
that such a requirement would violate a broadcaster's right to "... impart
information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers." 
37
As with the right to receive information across national borders, Article 19
of the Universal Declaration, read alone, would appear to grant an unre-
stricted right to impart information. Again, however, this right must be
read in conjunction with the limitations on this right expressed in Article
29 of the Universal Declaration and Article 19 of the Civil and Political
Covenant. Consequently, a receiving state should be able to argue that the
broadcaster's right to impart information is subject to the receiving state's
right to insist on prior consent with regard to certain types of program-
ming. Again however, a receiving state should not be able to contend that
the broadcaster's rights are subject to an absolute right of prior consent. 38
PRIOR CONSENT AND A BALANCED FLOW OF INFORMATION
In recent years, international attention has increasingly focused on the
imbalances in the flow of international communications. Critics, primarily
from the Third World, contend that the Western notion of "freedom of
information" actually has resulted in a "one-way" flow, a situation which
they contend is contrary to the aims of the human rights provisions.
According to the MacBride Report, 39
the critics from the developing world have found by experience that the
theory of "free flow" is invalidated by the overwhelming preponderance of
information circulated from the small number of industrialized countries into
the huge area of the developing world. In order to be really free, information
flows have to be two-way, not simply in one direction. 40
In the view of these critics, progress towards a true free flow is thwarted
by overemphasis on the "right to receive" and neglect of the rights "to
seek" and "to impart" information:
This unilateral approach has distorted the issues, and in many instances,
reduced the whole problem of free flow to defending the media from official
restrictions. In reality, such a limitation on the concept means that power
centres in the communications world are trespassing on the full rights of the
individual. 4 1
Whether Article 19 actually endorses a balanced flow of information is
not entirely clear. Although the right to "impart" information is granted
to "everyone," clearly it is not feasible to grant an unconditional right of
access for broadcasting to anyone who so desires. As far as the right to
"seek" information, the intent of Article 19 would seem to be to create a
right for the individual to acquire information as free from government
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obstruction as possible within the confines of the allowable limitations. 42
Discussions on Article 19 of the Civil and Political Covenant indicate that
the clause "freedom to seek" was specifically chosen over "freedom to
gather" because ". . . it implied the right to active inquiry while "gather"
had a connotation of passively accepting news provided by governments
or news agencies." 43 Written in 1948, the Universal Declaration does not
seem to have been designed to deal specifically with the question of an
imbalance in the international flow of communications.
Although Article 19 may not explicitly address imbalances in modern
communications, one may nevertheless draw inferences from the provision
with regard to the flow of information. A one-way flow of information can
be viewed as an obstruction of the individual's right to seek information
by limiting his access to a broad range of information and ideas. A balanced
flow, on the other hand, strengthens the individual inquiry which the
provisions aim to encourage and consequently facilitates the goals of the
human rights instruments.
Assuming that Article 19 implicitly endorses a balanced flow of infor-
mation over a one-way flow, one must nevertheless question whether a
prior consent requirement for direct satellite broadcasting is consistent
with this objective. If the goal of balanced flow advocates is simply to
reduce the flow of information from developed to less-developed countries
to the level of information flowing in the opposite direction, a strict prior
consent requirement would indeed be an effective means of achieving this
result. However, the objective of creating a balanced flow should not be
intended to reduce world-wide informational exchange, but rather to en-
courage the "free dissemination of information and ideas and a broader
exchange of views." 44 It is difficult to see how granting receiving nations
tight control over incoming broadcasts would achieve this objective.
Prior consent is often justified as a necessary response to the one-way
flow of information because of the threat to the cultural integrity of devel-
oping countries posed by this imbalance. Direct satellite broadcasting is
viewed as potentially exacerbating this threat, on the theory that United
States economic and technical superiority would result in domination by
American commercial networks absent regulation of direct broadcast satel-
lites. 45 However, it is not clear that the best response to this threat is an
absolute right of governmental censorship of all satellite broadcasting.
Prior consent implies that the government is best suited to decide what
broadcasting poses a threat to local culture, a hypothesis which may not
be entirely correct. Absent clear standards, the result could be arbitrary
decisions induced more by political than cultural concerns. Broadcasting
which clearly poses a threat to valid cultural concerns, such as pornogra-
phy or racist programming, could be controlled better by the enunciation
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of more precise standards for international broadcasting, rather than grant-
ing receiving states a blanket right of prior consent. 46
CONCLUSION
The international discussions on a legal regime for international direct
satellite broadcasting present the difficult problem of defining the scope of
Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Interna-
tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. This article has argued that
the fundamental intent of Article 19 is to remove obstructions to the right
of the individual to acquire information and ideas from across national
boundaries. While the development of a balanced flow of international
communications would strengthen the international dissemination of in-
formation and ideas, a legal regime incorporating a requirement of absolute
prior consent is inconsistent with the general intent of Article 19 and, for
that matter, with the development of a balanced flow of information. The
inequities in modern communications should not be solved by the creation
of additional obstructions to existing sources of information but rather by
positive cooperation among developed and less-developed countries to
increase the communications capabilities of the less-developed countries.
Although a requirement of strict prior consent should be resisted, it is
clear that the human rights instruments envision a role for state govern-
ments with regard to incoming information. As a result, a government
necessarily has a right of prior consent with regard to the broadcasting of
certain types of programming. Consequently, in any future discussions on
direct satellite broadcasting, the international community should seek to
define the broad limitations stated generally in the human rights provi-
sions to attempt to achieve consensus on those areas of programming
considered particularly objectionable. In this manner, the protection of
cultural integrity could be enhanced while the free flow of information
would be preserved.
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